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Abstract
When interpreting disjunctive sentences of the form ‘A or B,’ young children have
been reported to differ from adults in two ways. First, children have been reported
to interpret disjunction inclusively rather than exclusively, accepting ‘A or B’ in con-
texts in which both A and B are true (Gualmini, Crain, Meroni, Chierchia & Guasti
2001; Chierchia, Crain, Guasti & Thornton 2001). Second, some children have been
reported to interpret disjunction conjunctively, rejecting ‘A or B’ in contexts in which
only one of the disjuncts is true (Paris 1973; Braine & Rumain 1981; Chierchia, Guasti,
Gualmini, Meroni, Crain & Foppolo 2004; Singh, Wexler, Astle, Kamawar & Fox 2015).
In this paper, we extend the investigation of children’s interpretation of disjunction to
include both simple and complex forms of disjunction, in two typologically unrelated
languages: French and Japanese. First, given that complex disjunctions have been
argued to give rise to obligatory exclusivity inferences (Spector 2014), we investigated
whether the obligatoriness of the inference would play a role in the acquisition of the
exclusive interpretation. Second, using a paradigm that makes the use of disjunc-
tion felicitous, we aimed to establish whether the finding of conjunctive interpretations
would be replicated for both simple and complex forms of disjunction, and in languages
other than English. The main findings from our experiment are that both French- and
Japanese-speaking children interpreted the simple and complex disjunctions either in-
clusively or conjunctively ; in contrast, adults generally accessed exclusive readings of
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both disjunctions. We argue that our results lend further support to the proposal
put forth in Singh et al. (2015), according to which the reason some children compute
conjunctive meanings while adults compute exclusive meanings is that the two groups
differ in their respective sets of alternatives for disjunction. Crucially, adults access
conjunction as an alternative to disjunction, and compute exclusive interpretations;
in contrast, children access only the individual disjuncts as alternatives, and therefore
either interpret the disjunction literally or compute conjunctive inferences. More gen-
erally, our findings can be explained quite naturally within recent proposals according
to which children differ from adults in the computation of scalar inferences because
they are more restricted than adults in the set of scalar alternatives they can access
(Barner, Brooks & Bale 2011; Tieu, Romoli, Zhou & Crain 2015b, among others).
1 Introduction
Languages like French and Japanese have both simple and complex forms of disjunction.
The simple forms of disjunction ou (1) and ka (2) are typically interpreted exclusively by
adults, i.e. schematically as (A∨B)∧¬(A∧B).
(1) La poule
det-hen
a pousse´
push-past
le bus
det-bus
ou
ou
l’avion
det-airplane
French
‘The hen pushed the bus or the airplane.’
(2) Niwatori-san-wa
hen-san-top
Bus-ka
Bus-ka
hikooki-o
airplane-acc
osita
push-past
Japanese
‘The hen pushed the bus or the airplane.’
The literal inclusive meaning of disjunction (3a) can be strengthened to an exclusive ‘not-
both’ interpretation (3c) by means of comparing the disjunctive sentence with the stronger
conjunctive alternative in (3b). Assuming the speaker is as informative as she can be (Grice
1975), the fact that she uttered the disjunction rather than the stronger conjunction can
lead us to conclude that the stronger alternative must be false (3c) (for more recent con-
ceptualizations, see van Rooij & Schulz 2004; Sauerland, Andersen & Yatsushiro 2005; and
Spector 2007).
(3) The hen pushed the bus or the airplane.
a. The hen pushed the bus or the airplane or both.
b. The hen pushed the bus and the airplane.
c. The hen pushed the bus or the airplane but not both.
We can also capture the strengthened meaning by means of a grammaticalized exhaustifica-
tion operator exh, as schematized in (4). This exhaustification operator takes a proposition
and its alternatives, and affirms the proposition while negating any alternatives that (i) are
not entailed by the assertion, and (ii) the negation of which doesn’t entail another alternative
(Spector 2007; Fox 2007; see also Spector (to appear) for a comparison of different versions
of Exh).1
1Note that while we make use of the exh-based approach for the purposes of the exposition, the acquisition
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(4) exh(The hen pushed the bus or the airplane) =
The hen pushed the bus or the airplane and not(The hen pushed the bus and the
airplane)
Note that the exclusivity inference in (3c) is cancellable, as shown by the acceptable contin-
uation in (5).
(5) The hen pushed the bus or the airplane. In fact, she pushed both.
In contrast to the simple forms in (1) and (2), the complex forms of disjunction in (6) and
(7), where French ou and Japanese ka are replaced by soit...soit and ka...ka, respectively,
are reported to give rise to exclusive readings obligatorily (Spector 2014).2
(6) La poule
det-hen
a pousse´
push-past
soit
soit
le bus
det-bus
soit
soit
l’avion
det-airplane
‘The hen pushed either the bus or the airplane.’
(7) Niwatori-san-wa
hen-san-top
Bus-ka
Bus-ka
hikooki-ka-o
airplane-ka-acc
osita
push-past
‘The hen pushed either the bus or the airplane.’
Spector (2014) reports that unlike the exclusivity inference associated with the simple dis-
junction ou, the exclusivity inference associated with soit...soit cannot be cancelled, as shown
by the contrast between (8) and (9):3
(8) a. Marie ira au cine´ma lundi ou mardi.
‘Mary will go to the movies on Monday or Tuesday’
b. Absolument ! Et elle ira meˆme a` la fois lundi ET mardi.
‘Absolutely! She will even go both days.’
(9) a. Marie ira au cine´ma soit lundi soit mardi.
‘Mary will go to the movies soit on Monday soit on Tuesday’
b. #Absolument ! Et elle ira meˆme a` la fois lundi ET mardi.
‘Absolutely! She will even go on both days.’
Given the difference in the obligatoriness of the exclusivity inference, Spector (2014) proposes
that soit...soit occurs obligatorily under the scope of an exhaustivity operator.
In this paper, we set out to investigate children’s comprehension of both simple and
complex forms of disjunction, in both French and Japanese. In particular, we examined the
role of obligatoriness in the acquisition of the exclusivity inference, by investigating whether
study we will describe does not hinge on a particular account of implicature, nor does it set out to adjudicate
between competing accounts of implicature.
2As indicated in the translations in (6) and (7), a similar equivalent in English may be either...or, which
also seems to be interpreted more exclusively than the simple disjunction or.
3Like other scalar implicatures, the exclusivity inference associated with simple disjunction typically
disappears in downward-entailing environments such as the scope of negation. It is less simple to assess
the presence of the implicature in the case of the complex disjunction, as soit...soit is a positive polarity
item (PPI); in the antecedent of a conditional, however, soit...soit receives an inclusive interpretation. See
Spector (2014) Section 5.1 for discussion of the licensing of PPI soit...soit in restrictors.
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children distinguish simple and complex disjunctions in terms of the readings they assign.
In the next section, we will review previous findings about the acquisition of disjunction.
Then we will present our experiment, conducted with French- and Japanese-speaking chil-
dren, and discuss our findings in light of recent proposals concerning children’s ability to
compute scalar implicatures.
2 Acquisition of disjunction
There are two main findings from previous work on the acquisition of disjunction that will be
relevant to our discussion. The first is that children typically accept a disjunctive description
‘A or B’ in contexts in which both A and B are true. The second is that children have been
reported to reject ‘A or B’ when only one of the two disjuncts is true.
2.1 Children are inclusive rather than exclusive
Children have been reported to interpret disjunction more ‘literally’ than adults, accepting
disjunctive descriptions of situations in which both disjuncts are made true (Paris 1973;
Braine & Rumain 1981; Chierchia, Crain, Guasti & Thornton 2001; Gualmini, Crain, Meroni,
Chierchia & Guasti 2001). For example, in a situation where the character Bunny paints
both a car and a truck, adults, but not children, tend to reject the description Bunny painted
the car or the truck. The usual interpretation of such a finding is that while adults are able
to compute an implicature of exclusivity from the disjunction, e.g., Bunny painted the car
or the truck, but not both, children access an inclusive interpretation of the disjunction, e.g.,
Bunny painted the car or the truck, or both.
This finding that children compute fewer exclusivity inferences than adults is consistent
with much previous work on the acquisition of scalar implicatures. In much of this literature,
it has been shown that children tend to be more accepting than adults are of underinformative
sentences (Noveck 2001; Papafragou & Musolino 2003; Barner, Brooks & Bale 2011, among
many others). For example, in a situation where three out of three horses jump over a fence,
children, unlike adults, tend to accept the description Some of the horses jumped over the
fence. As in the previous case of disjunction, the usual interpretation here is that children,
unlike adults, fail to compute the scalar implicature Some but not all of the horses jumped
over the fence.
Previous findings on children’s abilities to access exclusive meanings of disjunction have
focused on simple disjunction in English. In our study, we raise the question of whether
children might access more exclusive readings of complex forms of disjunction. In particular,
given that the exclusivity inference has been argued to be obligatory for complex disjunctions,
we investigate whether children acquiring languages that have both simple and complex forms
of disjunction are more likely to interpret the complex form exclusively than the simple form.
2.2 Children interpret disjunction conjunctively
Another previous finding concerning children’s interpretation of disjunction has been that
some children interpret the disjunction conjunctively, rejecting disjunctive descriptions of
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situations in which only one disjunct is true (Paris 1973; Braine & Rumain 1981; Chierchia,
Guasti, Gualmini, Meroni, Crain & Foppolo 2004; Singh, Wexler, Astle, Kamawar & Fox
2015). One possible explanation of such a finding is that these children are simply confusing
the lexical items for disjunction and conjunction, e.g., or and and in English. As Singh
et al. (2015) point out, however, various studies in the developmental literature indicate
that there is no such conjunctive behaviour in downward-entailing environments. Children
acquiring English, Mandarin Chinese, and Japanese, for example, have been shown to assign
an adult-like inclusive semantics for disjunction in the scope of negation (Crain, Gardner,
Gualmini & Rabbin 2002; Gualmini & Crain 2002; Goro & Akiba 2004; Jing, Crain & Hsu
2005). That is, they interpret the disjunction inclusively, adhering to De Morgan’s laws, as
in (10a), and do not appear to interpret the disjunction as conjunction, as in (10b).
(10) The pig didn’t eat the carrot or the pepper.
a.  The pig didn’t eat the carrot and the pig didn’t eat the pepper
b. 6 It’s not the case that the pig ate both the carrot and the pepper
Further evidence against a lexical misanalysis account of children’s conjunctive behaviour
on disjunction can be found in their inclusive interpretation of disjunction in various other
downward-entailing environments: the scope of before in English and zai...zhiqian ‘before’
in Mandarin (Notley, Zhou, Jensen & Crain 2012), the restrictor of every (Gualmini, Meroni
& Crain 2003; Su 2013), the nuclear scope of not every (Notley, Zhou, Jensen & Crain
2012), only (Goro, Minai & Crain 2005; Jing, Crain & Hsu 2005), none (Gualmini & Crain
2002), and nobody (Su, Zhou & Crain 2012), and in the antecedent of the conditional ruguo in
Mandarin (Su 2014). Su (2014) provides further evidence that children as a group distinguish
disjunction and conjunction in the consequent of conditionals. In a context in which both
disjuncts/conjuncts in the consequent are made true, Su reports that children accept (11)
less than 15% of the time, compared to over 90% of the time in response to (12).
(11) If the swordfish walks out of the maze, then he will get a butterfly or a crown.
(12) If the swordfish walks out of the maze, then he will get a butterfly and a crown.
Taken together, the findings of these studies argue quite strongly against the idea that
children assign a conjunctive lexical semantics to the disjunction, and render the finding of
a conjunctive interpretation in unembedded contexts a rather surprising one. One natural
concern is whether the conjunctive interpretation was simply an artefact of the particular
task that Singh et al. (2015) used. In particular, they used a Truth Value Judgment Task
(Crain & Thornton 1998), but with static pictures rather than full stories, and presented
the test sentences in Description mode rather than Prediction mode. That is, the puppet
would utter the disjunctive test sentence after having already seen the picture. For example,
participants would be shown either a picture of a boy holding a banana and an apple, or
a picture in which the apple was on a table and the boy was holding only the banana. A
puppet, who could see the picture as well, would then describe the picture using a disjunctive
test sentence, e.g., The boy is holding an apple or a banana.
There are two worries one may have about such materials. First, static images may
not provide enough of a context to constrain possible interpretations and make the relevant
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readings plausible, especially for young children. Second, the use of disjunction typically gives
rise to an ignorance inference that the speaker does not know which of the two disjunct holds.
If uttered in Description mode then, the puppet’s assertion is rather infelicitous, given he
can see which of the disjuncts holds in the picture.4 One of the goals of the experiment to be
presented in Section 3 then, is to determine whether the finding of conjunctive interpretations
is replicable, once these methodological concerns are addressed.
To account for their results in light of the previous literature suggesting that children
have an inclusive semantics for disjunction in downward-entailing environments, Singh et al.
(2015) propose an account that explains both why children tend to be more inclusive than
adults, and why some children appear to interpret disjunction conjunctively. Their proposal
appeals to current explanations of children’s difficulties with scalar implicatures. Before we
look at their account, it may be instructive to consider briefly this background upon which
Singh et al. build their proposal.
2.2.1 On the role of alternatives in children’s implicatures
According to recent proposals in the developmental literature on implicatures, children are
capable of computing scalar implicatures when the scalar alternatives that they require are
made easily accessible (Chierchia, Crain, Guasti & Thornton 2001; Gualmini, Crain, Meroni,
Chierchia & Guasti 2001; Barner, Brooks & Bale 2011; Tieu, Romoli, Zhou & Crain 2015b).
On these proposals, children may indeed fail to compute the implicature in (13b) from
(13a), but this is not due to a general inability to compute implicatures; rather children
have difficulty retrieving all as a lexical scalar alternative to some.5
(13) a. Some of the horses jumped over the fence.
b. not(All of the horses jumped over the fence)
Such a hypothesis concerning children’s performance on scalar implicatures finds evidence
from a few sources. For example, when children are presented with the two scalar alternatives
explicitly, they are capable of selecting the stronger alternative. Chierchia et al. (2001) and
Gualmini et al. (2001) show, for example, that in a context in which both disjuncts are true,
children are more likely to reward a puppet who utters the stronger alternative in (14b) than
a puppet who utters the weaker alternative in (14a).
(14) a. Every dwarf chose a bike or a skateboard.
b. Every dwarf chose a bike and a skateboard.
Children’s performance on scalar implicatures has also been shown to be improved by the
insertion of an overt only, though crucially only in cases where the alternatives are context-
4These methodological concerns are particularly worrisome given Singh et al. report that they had to
exclude 25 of the 56 children they tested, after these children failed to perform significantly above chance on
controls.
5As Tieu et al. (2015b) point out, the precise difficulty children encounter with alternatives may have
to do with lexical retrieval, e.g., a difficulty retrieving all from the lexicon when presented with some, or it
may have to do with lexical development, i.e. children must lexicalize some and all as co-scalar alternatives.
Either way, if it is not made explicit to the child that all is indeed an alternative to some, children are
expected to fail to compute the implicature.
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dependent, i.e. explicitly provided in the context (Barner et al. 2011). For example, when
shown a picture of a cat, a cow, and a dog, all of which are sleeping, children correctly
reject (15a), unlike (15b). No facilitatory effect is found when the quantifier some is used,
however; even with the presence of only in (16a), children fail to reject the sentence. The
interpretation of this result is that children are capable of carrying out the procedure by
which strengthened meanings are derived, e.g., exhaustification, but only when they can
access the lexical alternatives that are required for the relevant inference.
(15) a. Only the cat and the dog are sleeping.
b. The cat and the dog are sleeping.
(16) a. Only some of the animals are sleeping.
b. Some of the animals are sleeping.
Finally, the hypothesis that children can compute implicatures not involving lexical retrieval
of alternatives is elaborated upon by Tieu et al. (2015b), who show that children are capable
of computing free choice inferences. A sentence containing the modal is allowed to and
disjunction, such as (17a), for example, gives rise to the free choice inference in (17b),
according to which Jack has free choice between the two options.
(17) a. Jack is allowed to have ice cream or cake.
b.  Jack is allowed to have ice cream and Jack is allowed to have cake.
This case is telling, because free choice inferences have been argued to be derived as a kind
of scalar implicature (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002; Alonso Ovalle 2005; Fox 2007; Klinedinst
2007; Chemla 2009; van Rooij 2010; Franke 2011; Chierchia 2013). Crucially, the alterna-
tives that are required to compute the free choice inference are present as substrings of the
assertion. According to Fox (2007), for example, we recursively exhaustify (18a) as in (18b),
negating the alternatives in (18c) and (18d) in order to generate the free choice inference in
(18e).
(18) a. Jack is allowed to have ice cream or cake.
b. exh(exh(Jack is allowed to have ice cream or cake))
c. exh(Jack is allowed to have ice cream), i.e. Jack is only allowed to have ice
cream
d. exh(Jack is allowed to have cake), i.e. Jack is only allowed to have cake
e.  not(exh(Jack is allowed to have ice cream)) and not(exh(Jack is allowed
to have cake))
i.e. Jack is allowed to have ice cream and Jack is allowed to have cake
Crucially, the alternatives that we need to negate correspond to the (pre-exhaustified) dis-
juncts of the original assertion, so children do not need to perform any lexical replacements
or retrieve any alternatives from the lexicon. Zhou et al. (2013) and Tieu et al. (2015b)
tested 4- and 5-year-old children’s comprehension of free choice inferences, and found that
children were successful at rejecting free choice statements in contexts where only one of the
disjuncts was true, e.g., when Jack was only allowed to have ice cream. While they failed to
compute classical scalar implicatures involving or/and and might/must, their performance
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on free choice inferences was adult-like.
Taken together, these studies suggest that children are capable of accessing strengthened
meanings; where they encounter difficulty is accessing the scalar alternatives from which
they can derive those strengthened meanings.
2.2.2 Conjunction through recursive exhaustification
Now let us return to the observation that some children appear to interpret disjunction
conjunctively. Singh et al.’s (2015) proposal is that children arrive at this conjunctive in-
terpretation through a non-adult-like implicature. Children recursively exhaustify the dis-
junctive statement ‘A or B’, effectively rendering it equivalent to the conjunctive statement
‘A and B’. Working within the larger alternatives-based approach to children’s performance
on implicatures, Singh et al. argue that children are indeed capable of exhaustifying, i.e. of
accessing strengthened meanings, just as adults are. Crucially however, children exhaustify
over a different set of alternatives from adults: unlike that of adults, children’s set of alter-
natives is not closed under conjunction. Let us demonstrate the disparity between children
and adults through an example.
When presented with the sentence in (19), adults have the conjunction as an alternative
(19a), and compute the exclusivity implicature in (19b). Children, on the other hand,
exhaustify as in (20a). Rather than accessing conjunction as an alternative, they access the
individual disjuncts in (20b) and (20c), generating the conjunctive implicature in (20d).
(19) The bunny painted the car or the truck.
a. The bunny painted the car and the truck.
b. not(The bunny painted the car and the truck)
i.e. The bunny didn’t paint both the car and the truck
(20) The bunny painted the car or the truck.
a. exh(exh(The bunny painted the car or the truck))
b. exh(The bunny painted the car), i.e. The bunny only painted the car
c. exh(The bunny painted the truck), i.e. The bunny only painted the truck
d. not(exh(The bunny painted the car)) and not(exh(The bunny painted the
truck))
i.e. The bunny painted both the car and the truck
As Singh et al. point out, the way that children arrive at the conjunctive reading of disjunc-
tion, according to their proposal, is exactly the same way that adults arrive at free choice
inferences (as we saw in (18)).6 As they note, their proposal therefore makes the prediction
that children should be capable of computing free choice inferences, and this prediction is
indeed borne out (Zhou et al. 2013; Tieu et al. 2015b).
In summary, Singh et al.’s (2015) account builds on previous findings that children only
compute strengthened meanings off of the alternatives that they can access. Their expla-
nation succeeds in accounting both for the observation that children often fail to compute
6See also Meyer (2015) for a related proposal concerning adults’ conjunctive interpretations of disjunction
in certain linguistic contexts.
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exclusivity inferences, and for the observation that some children access a conjunctive inter-
pretation of disjunction.
2.2.3 Ignorance inferences
Before we move on to our experiment, we will briefly mention here one further study that
merits closer examination in light of Singh et al.’s findings of conjunctive interpretations
of disjunction. Hochstein, Bale, Fox & Barner (2014) compared 4- and 5-year-old English-
speaking children’s performance on ignorance implicatures such as (21b) and scalar implica-
tures such as (22b).
(21) a. The bear took a plate or a cup.
b.  The speaker does not know whether or not the bear took a plate, and the
speaker does not know whether or not the bear took a cup.
(22) a. Each animal has an apple or a strawberry.
b.  It is not the case that each animal has both an apple and a strawberry.
Hochstein et al. point out that on standard neo-Gricean accounts, the derivation of (21b)
and (22b) involve the same computations and formal alternatives, with the only difference
being the strength of the final inference (see Hochstein et al. 2014:8-9 for details). To test
whether 4- and 5-year-old children could compute ignorance inferences such as (21b), the
authors presented children with a task in which they would hear a disjunctive statement,
and then had to decide if that statement was uttered by an action figure who could see what
had happened, or by a blindfolded action figure who could not see what was happening.
The rationale was that if children computed the ignorance implicature associated with the
disjunctive sentence, they would attribute it to the blindfolded character.
Hochstein et al. (2014) report that while the 5-year-olds they tested failed to compute the
scalar implicature in (22b), most of them nevertheless sucessfully computed the ignorance
implicatures, attributing the disjunctive statements to the blindfolded puppet. This was the
case whether only one, or both of the disjuncts were made true. As an anonymous reviewer
points out, if some children always computed conjunctive interpretations of the disjunction,
then when both disjuncts were made true in Hochstein et al.’s experiment, these children
should have selected the ‘seeing’ puppet rather than the blindfolded puppet. More generally,
the conjunctive meaning for disjunction reported in Singh et al. (2015) should imply that
the speaker believes both of the disjuncts are true. If some children compute conjunctive
meanings for disjunction, they should not compute ignorance implicatures about each of the
disjuncts. On the face of it, the two sets of findings are not immediately compatible.
While a systematic comparison of the two studies would take us too far afield for the
present purposes, we remain optimistic that a better understanding of the precise condi-
tions that drive children towards one reading of the disjunction over another will ultimately
explain the potential disparity between the Singh et al. and Hochstein et al. findings. For
example, since the two tasks targeted distinct inferences, they naturally differed in various
ways, including the nature of the task and the question that was asked of the children. In
order to better understand the compatibility of the two sets of findings, we need a better
understanding of what factors push children to compute certain inferences in some cases but
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not others.
For our purposes, we will deliberately set aside the issue of ignorance by focusing on
what interpretation children assign to the disjunction – when this disjunction is felicitously
uttered. We will do so by implementing a guessing game (i.e. a Truth Value Judgment Task
in Prediction mode), in which it will be made clear to participants from the outset that the
speaker is ignorant as to the outcome; therefore the judgments should have nothing to do
with whether or not the speaker was ignorant, only with whether the disjunctive statement
described the outcome.
2.3 Our study
Previous results reveal that children typically interpret disjunction inclusively, and sometimes
access a conjunctive interpretation of disjunction. Many of these studies have been restricted
to simple disjunction in English, however. In our study, we raise three new research questions,
which have not been addressed in any of the previous studies on children’s comprehension
of disjunctive sentences.
First, does the obligatoriness of the exclusivity inference for complex disjunction play a
role in children’s acquisition of exclusive readings? Free choice inferences have been argued
to be obligatory, and as we have seen, 4-year-old children appear to perform better on these
than classical scalar implicatures (Zhou et al. 2013; Tieu et al. 2015a). Another kind of
implicature that sees improved performance in children is the exactly-n interpretation of nu-
merals (Papafragou & Musolino 2003; Huang, Spelke & Snedeker 2013). Huang et al. (2013)
and Papafragou & Musolino (2003) propose that children’s relatively improved performance
on numerals provides evidence for an exact semantics for numerals. While the analysis
of numerals remains controversial, a potential alternative explanation is that the exactly-
n meaning arises as an obligatory implicature, and (assuming obligatory implicatures are
acquired earlier) is therefore acquired earlier than optional implicatures.
The idea that obligatoriness might play a role in the acquisition of a particular reading
becomes quite natural on the basis of considerations of the kind of evidence the child learner
may receive in her input. If the exclusivity inference is obligatory in the case of the complex
disjunction, it stands to reason that whenever the child encounters this form of disjunction in
her input, it will arise in a context that makes the exclusive reading of the disjunction true,
i.e. that verifies only one of the disjuncts. On the other hand, the exclusive interpretation of
the simple disjunction, while it may be preferred, is not obligatory. We may therefore expect
to find evidence of the simple disjunction being used both in those contexts that support
the inclusive reading and those that support the exclusive reading. In other words, the child
should receive categorical evidence for the exclusivity of complex disjunction, but perhaps
more equivocal evidence for simple disjunction. This difference provides a natural grounds
for investigating the role of obligatoriness in the acquisition of the exclusive interpretation
of the different forms of disjunction.
A second goal of the present study is to establish whether the conjunctive interpretation
of disjunction can be replicated in languages other than English. The finding of conjunctive
interpretations across different languages would speak further against the idea that children
may simply confuse the morphemes for disjunction and conjunction.
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Finally, no previous studies have compared children’s calculation of the exclusivity in-
ference in both simple and complex forms of disjunction. While it might be plausible that
children confuse the morphemes for conjunction and simple disjunction, it seems less likely
that children would confuse the morphemes for conjunction and complex disjunction. More-
over, given that exclusive readings are argued to be obligatory for complex disjunctions, it
would be surprising to see children accessing the non-adult-like conjunctive interpretation
of the complex form. On the other hand, Singh et al.’s (2015) proposal would predict that
conjunctive interpretations should be possible for both forms: if children lack the conjunctive
alternative but can compute conjunctive inferences from the individual disjuncts, they may
do so in the case of the complex disjunction, just as they do for simple disjunction.
3 Experiment
We designed an experiment to investigate the comprehension of simple and complex forms of
disjunction in French and Japanese, i.e. ou/soit...soit in French and ka/ka...ka in Japanese.
Our experiment was conducted in French and Japanese, but the materials will be described
here in English. The original French and Japanese materials can be found in the Appendix.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
We tested 28 French-speaking children (3;07–6;06, M=4;05) at local preschools in Paris,
and 18 Japanese-speaking children (4;07–6;06, M=5;05) at a preschool in Osaka. We also
tested 20 adult native speakers of French at the Ecole Normale Supe´rieure in Paris, and 21
adult native speakers of Japanese at the University of Osaka, using the same materials and
procedure.7 French adults were paid 3AC for their participation, while Japanese adults were
paid 500U.
These sample sizes were chosen on the basis of practical considerations. We decided before
any testing began that we would test as many French- and Japanese-speaking children as
we could gain access to in the Paris and Osaka preschools. The final sample sizes are similar
to those reported in previous Truth Value Judgment Task experiments in the developmental
literature on scalar implicatures.
3.1.2 Procedure
We used a modified Truth Value Judgment Task (Crain & Thornton 1998, 2000) in Prediction
mode, presented to the participants in the form of a ‘guessing game’. Participants were
introduced to a puppet named Raffie the Giraffe, and were told that they would play a game
with her on the computer. Pre-recorded videos of the puppet’s utterances created the ruse
that the puppet was participating live via webcam.
7These numbers exclude three Japanese and five French children who failed to pass the control trials.
An additional two French children were excluded as it was reported that their first language was English.
Finally, two Japanese adults were excluded for making at least two errors on control trials.
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The reason we chose to run the task in Prediction mode rather than the typical Descrip-
tion mode, where the puppet describes an event that has already unfolded, was meant to
make the use of disjunction felicitous. In particular, the use of disjunction typically gives rise
to an ignorance inference that the speaker does not know which of the two disjunct holds.
If uttered in Description mode then, the puppet’s assertion could have potentially given rise
to infelicity, given the puppet had just witnessed the relevant event unfold.
Each trial consisted of three stages (see Figure 1). First, the participant would see a
picture and hear a short introduction about the character in the picture. In the second step,
the puppet would appear on the screen to make a guess about what would happen next in
the story.8 At this stage, children would also be prompted to repeat the puppet’s sentence,
to ensure that they had correctly heard the statement. In the final scene, participants saw
the outcome, and had to decide if the puppet had guessed correctly or not. Participants
had to stamp under a happy or sad face on a scorecard to indicate their responses. We also
elicited follow-up justifications after affirmative and negative responses, in order to ascertain
children’s reasoning for their responses.
Figure 1: The three stages of an example trial, accompanying the test sentence The hen
pushed (either) the bus or the airplane. Scene 1: There once was a hen who loved to play
with her toys, and she especially loved to push them around! One day her papa gave her
two new toys: a bus and an airplane! The hen was very happy to play with them. Let’s see
if Raffie can guess what happened next! Scene 2: Experimenter: Raffie, tell us, what
happened next? Puppet: The hen pushed the bus or the airplane. Experimenter: Let’s
see if Raffie’s right! Scene 3: (following animation of hen pushing the bus down the hill)
Look, the hen pushed that one! Did Raffie guess right?
All children were tested individually in a quiet room away from their peers. Their re-
sponses were videorecorded for later analysis. Adult control participants were also tested
one at a time, using exactly the same materials and procedure.
8Although the puppet’s sentence was a guess, it was uttered in the past tense. As can be seen in Figure 1,
the use of the past tense was quite natural in the context of the rest of the story, which was also told in
the past tense. We reasoned that young children are very often presented with stories and storybooks that
describe events in the past tense, and thus would be more comfortable with such narratives.
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3.1.3 Materials
There were three conditions involving disjunctive test sentences such as The hen pushed the
bus or the airplane. In the target ‘1-disjunct-true’ (1DT) condition (e.g., Figure 1), the
outcome of the story was such that only one of the disjuncts was verified, for example, the
hen pushed only the bus. In the target ‘2-disjunct-true’ (2DT) condition, the outcome of
the story was such that both disjuncts were verified, for example, the hen would push both
the bus and the airplane.
Participants also saw a ‘0-disjunct-true’ (0DT) control condition, in which the hen would
push neither object, as well as filler sentences that did not contain disjunction. All test and
control sentences can be found in the Appendix.
Each participant saw four repetitions of both the 1DT condition and 2DT conditions,
two repetitions of the 0DT control condition, and three disjunction-less fillers, for a total of
thirteen experimental trials. These thirteen trials, presented in one of two pseudorandomized
orders, were preceded by two training items: on one practice trial, the puppet made a guess
that turned out to be clearly verified, and on the second, the puppet made a guess that
turned out to be clearly wrong. The purpose of the practice trials was to show that the
puppet was capable of making both good and bad guesses, and more generally to familiarize
the participants with the task.
The purpose of the 1DT and 2DT conditions was to determine how participants inter-
preted disjunction. Collecting pairs of response types would allow us to determine whether
participants were interpreting the disjunction inclusively, exclusively, or conjunctively. Table
1 contains the expected responses to the two target conditions, depending on the interpre-
tation of disjunction. In short, participants’ responses to the two target conditions would
allow us to identify which of the three interpretations they were assigning to the disjunction.
Interpretation of disjunction 1DT 2DT
Inclusive (literal) yes yes
Exclusive yes no
Conjunctive no yes
Table 1: Expected responses to the two target conditions, according to each interpretation
of the disjunction.
3.2 Results
The data and R script for our experiment are available online at http://semanticsarchive.
net/Archive/mE4YmYwN/TYCRSC-AcqDisj.html.
3.2.1 Control conditions
Children and adults performed as expected on control trials, with both groups displaying
above 90% accuracy.
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3.2.2 Target conditions
The results from the target conditions are presented in Figure 2. We fitted a mixed-effects
logit model on the children and adults responses to the 1DT condition, with Age group,
Disjunction type, Language and the interaction between Disjunction type and Language as
fixed effects (using the lme4 package in R, ?). Since all these factors are between-subject, the
random effects only consisted of by-subject random intercepts. A comparison with a model
without the effect of Age group revealed that this factor explained a substantive share of
the variance (χ2(1) = 60, p < .001). Indeed, adults across both language groups and both
forms of disjunction accepted on nearly all trials; in contrast, the child groups accepted much
less often in this condition. As we will see in our discussion of the individual results, this
tendency to reject more than adults in the 1DT condition may be indicative of a conjunctive
interpretation of the disjunction.
A model with the same structure of fixed and random effects was fitted to responses from
the 2DT condition, and showed that adults tended to reject across both language groups and
both forms of disjunction; this result is consistent with previous findings suggesting adults
interpret the disjunction exclusively. Children, on the other hand, were more accepting
than adults in the 2DT condition (model comparison: χ2(1) = 84, p < .001); children’s
yes-responses here could be consistent with inclusive or conjunctive interpretations of the
disjunction.9
A model with Age (standardized from the age in days), Condition, Language, Disjunction
type and all possible interactions between these factors was fitted on the children’s responses
to the 1DT and 2DT conditions (with by-subject random intercepts and slopes for Condition,
which was the only within-subject factor). The main effect of age did not seem significant
(estimated z = .3, p = .75), nor did any of the seven interactions involving age. The model
was not significantly better than a similar model without any effect of Age (χ2(8) = 3.9, p =
.87).
9Our attempts to improve upon the methodology in Singh et al. (2015) appear to have led to observable
differences in the adult results. In particular, Singh et al.’s adults did not differ in their responses to the
1DT and 2DT conditions (mean acceptances of 3.73/5 vs. 3.35/5, respectively), while our adults displayed
a much clearer acceptance pattern in the 1DT condition, and a much clearer rejection pattern in the 2DT
condition. Our results more clearly reveal the expected exclusivity inferences.
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Figure 2: Percentage of yes-responses from children and adults to 1DT conditions (plain
bars) and 2DT conditions (hashed bars), across disjunction types and languages.
In Figure 3, we represent each individual as a function of his/her responses on the 1DT
and 2DT conditions. These responses were then used to categorize each participants for
analyses, following the scheme presented in Table 1. Table 2 provides details regarding the
number of children who fell into each category.
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Figure 3: This figure represents each individual as a combination of his/her acceptance
rate on 1DT targets (x-axis) and 2DT targets (y-axis). As indicated in the figure, (i) the
bottom right corner in this space corresponds to participants who consistently accessed an
exclusive reading (i.e. giving ‘yes’-responses on at least three of four 1DT targets, and ‘no’-
responses on at least three of four 2DT targets); (ii) the top right corner corresponds to
inclusive responders (who gave at least three out of four ‘yes’ responses in both 1DT and
2DT conditions); and (iii) the top left corner corresponds to conjunctive responders (who
rejected at least three of four 1DT targets but accepted at least three of four 2DT targets).
See Table 2 for exact numbers of children in each category.
As we can see in Figure 3, adult participants in both language groups interpreted both
forms of the disjunction exclusively. More precisely, 38 of 41 adults were categorized as
exclusive, whereas only 3 of 46 children were exclusive (χ2-test: χ2(1) = 61, p < .001). The
children instead could be categorized as inclusive or conjunctive; there was no significant
difference observed between the number of inclusive and conjunctive children (14 vs. 19, out
of 46; χ2-test: χ2(1) = 0.8, p = .38).
A quasi-Poisson model with Category as a unique fixed effect (inclusive, conjunctive or
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French Japanese
Total
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Inclusive 4 5 3 2 14
Conjunctive 6 5 5 3 19
Exclusive 3 0 0 0 3
Total (with NA) 14 14 11 7 46
Table 2: Counts of individual children categorized by language and disjunction type. The
Total row includes 10 children who could not be categorized because they were at exactly
50% in at least one condition.
exclusive) was fitted to the data presented in Table 2 (thus fitting one λ-parameter for each
row in the table). The log total number of children for each column was taken as the offset
for the model.10 This model was significantly better than a model with only an intercept (one
λ for the whole table, χ2(2) = 13, p = .001) and a saturated Poisson model (with as many
λ-parameters as cells in the table) was not significantly better, suggesting that the model
with three parameters is sufficient to explain most of the variance (χ2(9) = 7.5, p = .59).
3.2.3 Follow-up justifications
Children were asked to repeat the puppet’s sentences, to ensure that they had correctly
heard them, and in particular, to ensure that they could reproduce the target disjunctive
form. Then, after they gave their yes- or no-response, we elicited follow-up justifications.
These justifications are useful because they confirm that children were indeed responding
in a manner consistent with one of the relevant interpretations (inclusive, exclusive, or con-
junctive). For example, inclusive responders would typically say ‘yes’ to both 1DT and 2DT
conditions, and when asked why, would restate the relevant action in the story that made the
disjunction true for them (23)-(24). Exclusive responders would crucially reject 2DT trials
by referring to the fact that the character had carried out the action with both objects (25).
In contrast, conjunctive responders would accept 2DT trials (26), but reject 1DT trials by
making reference to the fact that the character had only carried out the action with one of
the two objects (27).
(23) Inclusive responders: Justifications for accepting 1DT
a. Test sentence: Le mouton a achete´ une guitare ou un piano.
‘The sheep bought a guitar or a piano’
Justification: [oui] c’est parce que le mouton elle voulait acheter le piano, elle
a dit qu’elle allait porter la guitare ou le piano
‘[yes] because the sheep wanted to buy the piano, she(=Rafie) said that she(=the
sheep) was going to carry the guitar or the piano’ (DISJ-C13-O-A, 4;01,26)
10Although the data from children who could not be categorized were not fitted by the model, they were
still counted for the offset. The offset in a Poisson model represents the exposure, and any child who passed
the controls could in principle have belonged to any of the categories.
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b. Test sentence: Le mouton a achete´ soit une guitare soit un piano.
‘The sheep bought soit a guitar soit a piano.’
Justification: [oui] elle a pris juste un piano
‘[yes] she took just a piano.’ (DISJ-C30-S-B, 5;05,22)
c. Test sentence: Le singe a colorie´ soit le triangle soit le cercle.
‘The monkey colored soit the triangle soit the circle.’
Justification: [oui] elle a colorie´ le rond
‘[yes] she colored the circle’ (DISJ-C30-S-B, 5;05,22)
d. Test sentence: La poule a pousse´ soit le bus soit l’avion.
‘The hen pushed soit the bus soit the airplane.’
Justification: [oui] elle a pousse´ l’autobus
‘[yes] she pushed the bus’ (DISJ-C30-S-B, 5;05,22)
(24) Inclusive responders: Justifications for accepting 2DT
a. Test sentence: La souris a porte´ une pomme ou une orange.
‘The mouse carried an apple or an orange’
Justification: [oui] elle a dit que elle va porter la pomme ou l’orange, elle a fait
bien
‘[yes] She said she was going to carry the apple or the orange, she did good’
(DISJ-C-13-O-A, 4;01,26)
b. Test sentence: La souris a porte´ soit une pomme soit une orange.
‘The mouse carried soit an apple soit an orange.’
Justification: [oui] c’est juste qu’elle a porte´ les deux et elle a dit les deux en
fait
‘[yes] it’s just that she carried both and she(=Rafie) said both actually’ (DISJ-
C30-S-B, 5;05,22)
c. Test sentence: La poule a pousse´ soit le train soit le bateau.
‘The hen pushed soit the train soit the boat.’
Justification: [oui] soit le bateau soit le train, c’est ce qu’elle a fait
‘[yes] soit the boat soit the train, that’s what she did’ (DISJ-C30-S-B,
5;05,22)
(25) Exclusive responders: Justifications for rejecting 2DT
a. Test sentence: Le lapin a peint la voiture ou le camion.
‘The rabbit painted the car or the truck’
Justification: [non] pas content parce qu’elle a dit la voiture ou le camion [...]
il a peint les deux
‘[no] not happy because she said the car or the truck [...] he painted both’
(DISJ-C01-O-A, 5;05,17)
b. Test sentence: La poule a pousse´ le train ou le bateau.
‘The hen pushed the train or the boat.’
Justification: [non] parce qu’elle a pousse´ les deux
‘[no] because she pushed both’ (DISJ-C01-O-A, 5;05,17)
c. Test sentence: La souris a porte´ soit une pomme soit une orange.
‘The mouse carried soit an apple soit an orange’
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Justification: [non] elle a pris les deux
‘[no] she took both’ (DISJ-C02-S-B, 5;03,19)
d. Test sentence: La poule a pousse´ le train ou le bateau.
‘The hen pushed the train or the boat’
Justification: [non] parce qu’elle a pousse´ le bateau et le train
‘[no] because she pushed the boat and the train’ (DISJ-C03-O-B, 5;02,17)
(26) Conjunctive responders: Justifications for accepting 2DT
a. Test sentence: Le lapin a peint soit la voiture soit le camion.
‘The rabbit painted soit the car soit the plane’
Justification: [oui] parce qu’il a peint les deux
‘[yes] because he painted both’ (DISJ-C02-S-B, 5;03,19)
b. Test sentence: Le lapin a peint soit la voiture soit le camion.
‘The rabbit painted soit the car soit the plane’
Justification: [oui] parce qu’elle en a peint deux
‘[yes] because she painted two of them’ (DISJ-C06-O-B, 4;06,02)
(27) Conjunctive responders: Justifications for rejecting 1DT
a. Test sentence: La poule a pousse´ soit le bus soit l’avion.
‘The hen pushed soit the bus soit the plane’
Justification: [non] parce qu’elle a pas pousse´ les deux [...] [elle avait dit] soit
l’avion soit le bus
‘[no] because she didn’t push both [...] [she had said] soit the plane soit the
bus’ (DISJ-C02-S-B, 5;03,19)
b. Test sentence: Le mouton a achete´ soit une guitare soit un piano.
‘The sheep bought soit a guitar soit a piano’
Justification: [non] parce que c’e´tait un seul piano, c’e´tait qu’un piano
‘[no] because it was only a piano, it was just a piano’ (DISJ-C06-O-B, 4;06,02)
c. Test sentence: La poule a pousse´ le bus ou l’avion.
‘The hen pushed the bus or the plane’
Justification: [non] parce qu’elle a pousse´ que le camion
‘[no] because she only pushed the truck’ (DISJ-C06-O-B, 4;06,02)
4 Discussion
To summarize, our experiment gave rise to three main findings. First, children compute
fewer exclusivity inferences from disjunction than adults. Second, children do not appear to
distinguish simple and complex forms of disjunction in comprehension. Finally, children in
both language groups appear to access a non-adult-like conjunctive interpretation of both
forms of disjunction. These three findings raise further questions about the acquisition of
disjunction, and also connect to current theorizing about children’s ability to compute scalar
implicatures.
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4.1 Children interpret disjunction inclusively
Our first finding was that roughly half of the children in both language groups interpreted
the disjunction inclusively. This was in contrast to adults, who all tended to interpret the
disjunction exclusively. This result is consistent with much of the previous work on scalar
implicatures, and on exclusivity inferences in particular (e.g., Chierchia et al. 2001; Gualmini
et al. 2001, among others). On the alternatives-based approach to children’s implicatures,
described in Section 2.2.1, this result arises because children fail to access conjunction as
an alternative to disjunction, and thereby are left with the literal inclusive interpretation of
disjunction.
4.2 On the role of obligatoriness
Our second finding was that children did not appear to assign different interpretations to
simple and complex disjunctions. Given that caregivers can be expected to use complex
disjunctions only when the exclusive reading is verified, it may be surprising that we did
not observe more exclusive interpretations from children in the complex disjunction condi-
tions. That is, we do not seem to observe any facilitatory effect of the obligatoriness of the
exclusivity inference for the complex disjunction.
It may be worth pointing out another example in the domain of inferences where obliga-
toriness seems not to have a facilitatory effect on children’s performance, namely the case of
plurality inferences, such as (28).
(28) a. Emily fed pigs.
b.  Emily fed more than one pig.
Spector (2007) analyzes the ‘more-than-one’ meaning of plural morphology as a kind of
scalar implicature which, like the exclusive implicature associated with complex disjunction,
is very difficult, if not impossible, to cancel (see also Sauerland, Andersen & Yatsushiro
2005; Zweig 2009; Ivlieva 2013; and Magri 2014 for relevant discussion and analyses). Given
the obligatoriness of the plurality inference then, one might expect that children should
show better performance on plurality inferences than classical scalar implicatures, which
are optional and much more easily cancelled. Yet it has been shown that preschool-aged
children compute fewer plurality inferences than adults, with performance completely on a
par with their behaviour on standard cases of scalar implicature (Tieu, Bill, Romoli & Crain
2014, 2015a; for further evidence of weak meanings for the plural, see Sauerland, Andersen
& Yatsushiro (2005) (Section 5), who examined children’s interpretation of bare plurals in
questions, and Barner, Chow & Yang (2009), who included a condition in which children
treated some-NPs as compatible with contexts in which there was only a single object).
Such data are surprising, because they suggest that hearing a sentence type exclusively in
contexts where the strengthened interpretation holds is not sufficient for children to simply
generalize to the strengthened meaning.11
11Put slightly differently, if a child hears a sentence type only when the strengthened meaning is true, one
could imagine the child simply deciding that the sentence type only has the strengthened meaning. It would
then be surprising to see the child interpreting the sentence on its literal meaning, let alone only being able
to access the literal meaning.
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A further connection to this issue and the role of the input comes from Morris’s (2008)
corpus study examining transcripts of exchanges between children and their caregivers (these
data are also described in Su 2014). Morris examined 240 transcriptions of audio-taped ex-
changes between 40 English-speaking children aged 2;00–5;00 (from the CHILDES database,
MacWhinney 2000), and found that between 75%–95% of uses of or in both children’s and
their caregivers’ productions were uttered in contexts where only one disjunct was verified.
If this preference to use disjunction in contexts where only one disjunct is true holds for both
simple and complex forms of disjunction, perhaps the input does not disproportionately drive
children towards exclusive readings of complex disjunction any earlier than it does for simple
disjunction. Alternatively, perhaps the unequivocal presence of complex disjunctions in such
contexts is insufficient to lead to earlier exclusive readings of the complex disjunction. Some
other factor, which may also prevent children from accessing the exclusive interpretation
of the simple disjunction, prevents them from accessing this interpretation of the complex
disjunction.
4.3 Children interpret disjunction conjunctively
Now let us address the conjunctive interpretation that was observed in roughly half of the
children in both language groups. Recall that our method addressed the methodological
concerns we raised about Singh et al.’s (2015) materials and method. We presented full
stories supporting the test sentences, and also presented the test sentences as predictions
(i.e. as the puppet’s guesses), thereby avoiding potential infelicity arising from the use of
disjunction. Yet we found, perhaps surprisingly, that the children we tested still accessed a
conjunctive interpretation of disjunction. Furthermore, this pattern of behaviour is observed
in two unrelated languages beyond English. This finding speaks against any explanation
that appeals to confusion stemming from superficial similarity between the morphemes for
disjunction and conjunction. It would be rather surprising to find that children across
languages confuse these morphemes. It would be even more surprising to find that children
confuse the morphemes even when the language in question contains two morphologically
distinct forms for disjunction.
It is therefore unlikely that children are incorrectly assigning a conjunctive lexical se-
mantics to the disjunction.12 Instead, we argue that our data provide further support for
Singh et al.’s (2015) proposal concerning how children arrive at the conjunctive interpreta-
tion. Given we observe the conjunctive pattern of behaviour across different languages, a
parsimonious explanation is that children are arriving at this conjunctive meaning by the
same means. In particular, we already have evidence from previous studies on implicatures
that children are quite capable of computing inferences off of the alternatives that they can
access. If, as Singh et al. (2015) propose, children can only access the individual disjuncts as
alternatives for the disjunction, and not the conjunction, it is not very surprising that they
arrive at a different inference from adults. Moreover, it is not so surprising that children do
this across languages. The nature of the alternatives does not change from language to lan-
guage: in the English, French, and Japanese experiments, children were given the individual
12Recall also that children consistently interpret disjunction inclusively in downward-entailing environ-
ments (Crain et al. 2002; Gualmini & Crain 2002; Goro & Akiba 2004; Jing et al. 2005, among many others).
21
disjuncts – but not the conjunctive alternative – from which some of them then went on to
compute the conjunctive meaning.
Singh et al.’s (2015) proposal can also be extended to account for the fact that we found
no effect of disjunction type. Again, the nature of the alternatives remains unchanged across
the two forms of disjunction. In order to compute the exclusive interpretation, children
need to access conjunction as an alternative to disjunction, and to compute the conjunctive
meaning, they need access to the individual disjuncts. It is not surprising that we observe
the same behavioural profiles across simple and complex disjunctions: in neither case is the
conjunctive alternative explicitly provided to the children, and in both cases the children
are given the individual disjunct alternatives that they need to compute the conjunctive
inference.
One may wonder why only half of the children computed a conjunctive meaning, while the
other half retained the inclusive meaning. The account endorsed here is compatible with the
observed split, but does not provide an explanation for why any given child would choose
one interpretation over the other. Imagine that the child passes through an early stage
of development where she cannot access the relevant lexical alternative, i.e. conjunction.
Such a child can only fall back on two possible interpretations, namely the inclusive and
conjunctive ones. A priori, it is not clear what should force them to choose one reading over
the other. In principle, the choice would come down to whether or not to exhaustify. Even
in adults, however, we do not necessarily have a precise understanding of all the factors that
drive the computation of inferences in some cases and not others. To reiterate, alternatives-
based approaches merely predict that children (who may otherwise appear to be inclusive or
conjunctive responders) will be capable of computing exclusivity inferences once they have
the relevant conjunctive alternative; it does not explain when or why they actually go on to
do so, nor which reading they will default to otherwise.
5 Conclusion
The findings of our experiment reveal differences between children and adults in the interpre-
tation of disjunction. Adults interpreted simple and complex forms of disjunction exclusively.
In contrast, 4- and 5-year-old children computed fewer exclusive readings, instead preferring
inclusive and conjunctive readings; this was the case for both simple and complex forms of
disjunction, in both languages. Importantly, we tried to ensure that the materials and task
made the use of both forms of disjunction felicitous; we can therefore be confident that the
conjunctive interpretations we observed were not the result of any infelicity involving the
materials or sentences.
Our findings can be explained within existing proposals about children’s abilities to
compute scalar implicatures: children can compute implicatures only when the required
alternatives are accessible (Barner et al. 2011; Singh et al. 2015; Tieu et al. 2015b). On
this alternatives-based approach, the key to children’s success or failure lies in the nature
of the alternatives. In the case of disjunction, children lack the conjunctive alternative, and
thus do not compute exclusivity implicatures. But they can easily access the individual
disjunct alternatives, which are contained within the sentences, and can therefore compute a
non-adult-like conjunctive inference from the disjunction. On such an approach then, both
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aspects of the disparity between children and adults are explained.
Appendix: Test sentences
2DT condition
(29) French – complex (soit...soit)
a. Le lapin a peint soit la voiture soit le camion.
‘Bunny painted soit the car soit the truck.’
b. Le singe a ouvert soit la feneˆtre soit la porte.
‘Monkey opened soit the window soit the door.’
c. La poule a pousse´ soit le train soit le bateau.
‘Hen pushed soit the train soit the boat.’
d. La souris a porte´ soit une pomme soit une orange.
‘Mouse carried soit an apple soit an orange.’
(30) Japanese – complex (ka...ka)
a. Usagi-san-wa
Bunny-Ms.-top
kuruma-ka
car-ka
torakku-ka-ni
truck-ka-to
iro-o
color-acc
nutta
painted
‘Ms. Rabbit painted the car or the truck.’
b. Osaru-san-wa
monkey-Mr.-top
mado-ka
window-ka
doa-ka-o
door-ka-acc
aketa.
opened
‘Mr. Monkey opened the windor or the door.’
c. Niwatori-san-wa
Chicken-Ms.-top
densya-ka
train-ka
booto-ka-o
boat-ka-acc
osita.
pushed
‘Ms. Chicken pushed the train or the boat.’
d. Nezumi-san-wa
Mouse-Ms.-top
ringo-ka
apple-ka
orenzi-ka-o
orange-ka-acc
hakonda.
carried
‘Ms. Mouse carried the apple or the orange.’
(31) French – simple (ou)
a. Le lapin a peint la voiture ou le camion.
‘Bunny painted the car or the truck.’
b. Le singe a ouvert la feneˆtre ou la porte.
‘Monkey opened the window or the door.’
c. La poule a pousse´ le train ou le bateau.
‘Hen pushed the train or the boat.’
d. La souris a porte´ une pomme ou une orange.
‘Mouse carried an apple or an orange.’
(32) Japanese – simple (ka)
a. Usagi-san-wa
Bunny-Ms.-top
kuruma-ka
car-ka
torakku-ni
truck-to
iro-o
color-acc
nutta
painted
‘Ms. Rabbit painted the car or the truck.’
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b. Osaru-san-wa
monkey-Mr.-top
mado-ka
window-ka
doa-o
door-acc
aketa.
opened
‘Mr. Monkey opened the windor or the door.’
c. Niwatori-san-wa
Chicken-Ms.-top
densya-ka
train-ka
booto-o
boat-acc
osita.
pushed
‘Ms. Chicken pushed the train or the boat.’
d. Nezumi-san-wa
Mouse-Ms.-top
ringo-ka
apple-ka
orenzi-o
orange-acc
hakonda.
carried
‘Ms. Mouse carried the apple or the orange.’
1DT condition
(33) French – complex (soit...soit)
a. La poule a pousse´ soit le bus soit l’avion.
‘Hen pushed soit the bus soit the plane.’
b. La souris a porte´ soit une banane soit une carotte.
‘Mouse carried soit a banana soit a carrot.’
c. Le singe a colorie´ soit le triangle soit le cercle.
‘Monkey coloured soit the triangle soit the circle.’
d. Le mouton a achete´ soit une guitare soit un piano.
‘Sheep bought soit a guitar soit a piano.’
(34) Japanese – complex (ka...ka)
a. Niwatori-san-wa
chicken-Ms.-top
Bus-ka
bus-ka
hikooki-ka-o
plane-ka-acc
osita.
pushed
‘Ms. Chicken pushed the bus or the plane.’
b. Nezumi-san-wa
mouse-Ms.-top
banana-ka
banana-ka
ninzin-ka-o
carrot-ka-acc
hakonda
carried
‘Ms. Mouse carried the banana or the carrot.’
c. Osaru-san-wa
Monkey-Mr.-top
sankaku-ka
triangle-ka
maru-ka-no
circle-ka-gen
iro-o
color-acc
nutta.
painted
‘Mr. Monkey painted the triangle or the circle.’
d. Hizuzi-san-wa
Sheep-Ms.-top
gitaa-ka
guitar-ka
piano-ka-o
piano-ka-acc
katta.
bought
‘Ms. Sheep bought the guitar or the piano.’
(35) French – simple (ou)
a. La poule a pousse´ le bus ou l’avion.
‘Hen pushed the bus or the plane.’
b. La souris a porte´ une banane ou une carotte.
‘Mouse carried a banana or a carrot.’
c. Le singe a colorie´ le triangle ou le cercle.
‘Monkey coloured the triangle or the circle.’
d. Le mouton a achete´ une guitare ou un piano.
‘Sheep bought a guitar or a piano.’
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(36) Japanese – simple (ka)
a. Niwatori-san-wa
chicken-Ms.-top
Bus-ka
bus-ka
hikooki-o
plane-acc
osita.
pushed
‘Ms. Chicken pushed the bus or the plane.’
b. Nezumi-san-wa
mouse-Ms.-top
banana-ka
banana-ka
ninzin-o
carrot-acc
hakonda
carried
‘Ms. Mouse carried the banana or the carrot.’
c. Osaru-san-wa
Monkey-Mr.-top
sankaku-ka
triangle-ka
maru-no
circle-gen
iro-o
color-acc
nutta.
painted
‘Mr. Monkey painted the triangle or the circle.’
d. Hizuzi-san-wa
Sheep-Ms.-top
gitaa-ka
guitar-ka
piano-o
piano-acc
katta.
bought
‘Ms. Sheep bought the guitar or the piano.’
0DT condition
(37) French – complex (soit...soit)
a. Le singe a colorie´ soit un coeur soit un losange.
‘Monkey coloured soit a heart soit a diamond.’
b. Le pingouin a peint soit les fruits soit les fleurs.
‘Penguin painted soit the fruit soit the flowers.’
(38) Japanese – complex (ka...ka)
a. Osaru-san-wa
Monkey-Mr.-top
haato-ka
heart-ka
daiya-ka-no
diamond-ka-gen
iro-o
color-acc
nutta.
painted
‘Mr. Monkey painted the heart or the diamond.’
b. Pengin-san-wa
Pinguin-Mr.-top
fruutu-ka
fruits-ka
ohana-ka-o
flower-ka-acc
kaita.
painted
‘Mr. Penguin painted the fruits or the flower.’
(39) French – simple (ou)
a. Le singe a colorie´ un coeur ou un losange.
‘Monkey coloured a heart or a diamond.’
b. Le pingouin a peint les fruits ou les fleurs.
‘Penguin painted the fruit or the flowers.’
(40) Japanese – simple (ka)
a. Osaru-san-wa
Monkey-Mr.-top
haato-ka
heart-ka
daiya-no
diamond-gen
iro-o
color-acc
nutta.
painted
‘Mr. Monkey painted the heart or the diamond.’
b. Pengin-san-wa
Pinguin-Mr.-top
fruutu-ka
fruits-ka
ohana-o
flower-acc
kaita.
painted
‘Mr. Penguin painted the fruits or the flower.’
Filler items
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(41) French
a. Le lapin a cueilli une banane. ‘Rabbit picked a banana.’ (yes-target)
Le lapin a cueilli une poire. ‘Rabbit picked a pear.’ (no-target)
b. Le singe a pris son parapluie. ‘Monkey took his umbrella.’ (yes-target)
Le singe a pris ses bottes. ‘Monkey took his boots.’ (no-target)
c. Le cochon a mis son chapeau. ‘Pig wore his hat.’ (yes-target)
Le cochon a mis son e´charpe. ‘Pig wore his scarf.’ (no-target)
(42) Japanese
a. Usagi-san-wa
Rabbit-Ms.-top
banana-o
banana-acc
totta.
took
‘Ms. Rabbit took the banana.’ (yes-target)
Usagi-san-wa
Rabbit-Ms.-top
nasi-o
pear-acc
totta.
took
‘Ms. Rabbit took the pear.’ (no-target)
b. Osaru-san-wa
Monkey-Mr.top
kasa-o
umbrella-acc
totta.
took
‘Mr. Monkey took the umbrella.’ (yes-target)
Osaru-san-wa
Monkey-Mr.top
Nagagutu-o
rainboots-acc
totta.
took
‘Mr. Monkey took the boots.’ (no-target)
c. Buta-san-wa
pig-Mr.-top
boosi-o
hat-acc
kabutta.
put.on
‘Mr. Pig put on the hat.’ (yes-target)
Buta-san-wa
Pig-Mr.-top
mafuraa-o
scarf-acc
sita.
did
‘Mr. Pig put on the scarf.’ (no-target)
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